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How does informality in emerging economies aﬀect the conduct of monetary and
ﬁscal policy? To answer this question we construct a two-sector, formal-informal new
Keynesian closed-economy. The informal sector is more labour intensive, is untaxed,
has a classical labour market, faces high credit constraints in ﬁnancing investment
and is less visible in terms of observed output. We compare outcomes under welfare-
optimal monetary policy, discretion and welfare-optimized interest-rate Taylor rules
alongside a balanced-budget ﬁscal regime. We compare the model, ﬁrst with no fric-
tions in these two markets, then with frictions in only the formal labour market and
ﬁnally with frictions on both credit markets and the formal labour market. Our
main conclusions are ﬁrst, labour and ﬁnancial market frictions, the latter assumed
to be stronger in the informal sector, cause the time-inconsistency problem to worsen.
The importance of commitment therefore increases in economies characterized by a
large informal sector with the features we have highlighted. Simple implementable
optimized rules that respond only to observed aggregate inﬂation and formal-sector
output can be signiﬁcantly worse in welfare terms than their optimal counterpart, but
are still far better than discretion. Simple rules that respond, if possible, to the risk
premium in the formal sector result in a signiﬁcant welfare improvement.
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Relatively little has been written on the conduct of monetary policies in economies with
a large informal sector. This is a reality in many emerging and in some OECD countries
and the study of informality can shed new lights on the impact of labour markets and
monetary policies on the economic performance of these economies.
The phenomenon, that we refer in our paper as ‘informality’ has been discussed using
diﬀerent terminology: unregistered, hidden, shadow, unoﬃcial underground and, in a more
restrictive sense black, economy. The term ‘hidden economy’ has often been used with
respect to advanced economies, whilst the term ‘informal economy’ has been usually been
applied to developing economies. Chen (2007) describes the move from the ‘old’ concept of
the informal sector to a more comprehensive view of the informal economy. The ‘new’ view
of informality which focuses on the worker and informal employment, that is employment
without any sort of protection, includes self-employment in unregistered ﬁrms and wage
employment in unprotected jobs. According to the deﬁnition used, the estimates of the
size of the informal economy can be very diﬀerent.1
In general, diﬀerent modelling strategies apply to describe diﬀerent phenomena. It is
possible to distinguish informality in the goods market, informality in the credit market
and informality in the labour market.2 Here we focus on the latter two phenonema, and
study the impact of monetary policy in an economy where the size of the informal labour
market is driven by the taxation regime and the diﬀering frictions in the two sectors.
This model describes an economy with two sectors producing two diﬀerent goods. In
equilibrium, workers who do not ﬁnd a job in the unionized formal labour market (i.e. the
sector with a higher labour standard), move to the informal sector. In our model public
goods are produced formally and the two sectors have diﬀerent technologies, the informal
sector being more labour intensive. Further distinctions are the introduction of a market
friction in the labour market in the formal sector, whilst the informal sector is frictionless
in this respect and the presence of ﬁnancial accelerators of diﬀering impact in the two
1Informality is also deﬁned in diﬀerent ways in various countries. For example, in India, the informal
sector is generally identiﬁed with the unorganized sector (no legal provision and no regular accounts).
According to the NCEUS report on Deﬁnitional and Statistical Issues relating to the Informal Economy,
the informal (or unorganized) economy is given by the informal (or unorganized) sector and its workers
plus the informal workers in the formal sector, where the unorganized (informal) sector is deﬁned as all
incorporated private enterprises owned by individuals/households with less than 10 workers. Also the
report deﬁnes unorganized (informal) workers, as workers in the unorganized sector, households, excluding
regular workers with social security beneﬁts, plus workers in the formal sector without any social security
beneﬁt NCEUS (2008).
2See Batini et al. (2010) for details.
1Figure 1: Size of Informal Economy around the World Schneider (2005)
sectors. Thus we capture some of the main characteristics of the informal sector: labour-
intensiveness, lack of public goods production and wage ﬂexibility and credit constraints.
We also consider, in relation to the conduct of monetary policy a further dimension of
informality: its lack of transparency. Price stickiness is added to both sector, but with
the informal sector relatively ﬂexible to give us the New Keynesian aspect and a model
that can be used to investigate the ﬂows between formal and informal sector and the link
between inﬂation and unemployment, i.e. the Phillips curves in countries with a large
informal economy.
Table 1: Characterizing Informality
Labour Market Credit Market Taxation Visibility Price Stickiness
F Sector frictions lower frictions taxed higher high
I Sector no frictions higher frictions untaxed lower low
We study optimal monetary policy and consider the extent to which the diﬃculty in
observing the informal sector aﬀects its eﬃcacy.
2The modelling approach also captures the a priori ambiguous impact of informality.
On the one hand, the ﬂexible and frictionless informal labour market reduces business cycle
costs. On the other hand, informality brings various costs due to the realistic assumption
that it lies outside the tax regime and it is often unobservable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows how our general
equilibrium economy relates to similar theoretical frameworks within the DSGE and the
informal economy literatures. Section 3 sets out details of our model. Section 4 ana-
lyzes steady-state properties and the calibration based on the steady state. Section 5
studies optimal monetary policy with and without commitment. Section 6 examines sim-
ple Taylor-type commitment rules and their ability to mimic their optimal counterpart.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Background Literature
Satchi and Temple (2009) and Marjit and Kar (2008) recognize the importance of a gen-
eral equilibrium analysis, but they often make assumptions which usually do not allow
for a comprehensive view of causes and eﬀects of informality. For example, standard as-
sumptions in the search-matching literature (i.e. linear utility function among the other),
exclude the consumption-hours decision. Conesa et al. (2002) represents an attempt in
this direction. The author describes a simple RBC model with an informal sector. They
introduce a second sector into a standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) model which is de-
scribed as an “underground” economy that has a diﬀerent technology, produces goods and
services that could otherwise be produced in the formal sector, but is not registered in NI
accounts. The main characteristics of the model includes: a wage premium which can be
seen as the opportunity cost of not working in the oﬃcial sector and labour indivisibilities
in the formal/registered sector. Households choose a probability of working in the informal
sector which can be interpreted as the purchase of lotteries in a perfectly insured market.
When a worker chooses the informal sector he/she enjoy more leisure at the price of a
smaller wage, while in the formal sector individuals work more, but receive a wage pre-
mium. In particular, the authors assume labour to be indivisible in the formal/registered
sector with hours worked ﬁxed exogenously. The main prediction of the model is that
wage premium diﬀerentials can explain the diﬀerent size of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations in
function of technological shocks. The intuition is the following: countries with a smaller
wage premium have a lower opportunity cost to participate in the formal sector and so
they have smaller participation rates. In those countries, the eﬀects of technological shocks
are ampliﬁed.
3A series of papers incorporate the search and matching approach into DSGE models to
explain the cyclical behaviour of employment, job creation, job destruction and inﬂation
rate in response to a monetary policy shock, but there are several unexplored area left
for research. 3 In general there is a rapidly growing literature on search and match
labour market in New Keynesian DSGE models in addition to Ravenna and Walsh (2007).
Christiano et al. (2007), Sala et al. (2008) and Thomas (2008) introduce labour market
frictions in New Keynesian models allowing the study of, both, the intensive and the
extensive margin of labour usage during the business cycle. Blanchard and Gali (2007)
adopt a simpler hiring cost approach in a New Keynesian framework.
Castillo and Montoro (2008) develop Blanchard and Gali (2007) by modelling a labour
market economy with formal and informal labour contracts within a New Keynesian model
with labour market frictions. This is the ﬁrst paper that analyses together the creation
of informal jobs and the interaction between the informal sector and monetary policy.
Informality is a result of hiring costs, which are a function of the labour market tightness.
In equilibrium , ﬁrms in the wholesale sectors balance the higher productivity of a formal
production process with the lower hiring costs of the informal process. Marginal costs will
then become a function also of the proportion of informal jobs in the economy. The inter-
esting results of this theoretical framework is that during period of high aggregate demand
the informal sector expands due to lower hiring costs associated with this technology. This
creates a link between informality, the dynamics of inﬂation and the transmission mech-
anism of monetary policy. In particular, the authors show that “informal workers act
as a buﬀer stock of labour that allows ﬁrms to expand output without putting pressure on
wages”. Castillo and Montoro (2008) allow for a voluntary decision where the marginal
worker is indiﬀerent between formal and informal sector. Labour market regulations may
reduce labour demand without introducing segmentation per se. While we recognize this
picture is realistic in many advanced economies and there is also evidence that shows the
existence of a voluntary, small ﬁrms sector in some developing countries as discussed in
Perry et al. (2007), we believe that in the majority of the developing world informality
is a result of segmentation where workers turn to the informal labour market when they
cannot ﬁnd a job in the formal sector. As in Satchi and Temple (2009) and Marjit and Kar
(2008) we model the idea that: “Unemployment is a luxury” and that “informal sector
activities provide an unoﬃcial safety-net in the absence of state-provided unemployment
insurance”.
As in Zenou (2008), we allow for a frictionless informal labour market. We also in-
3See Yasgiv (2007) for a survey on the developments of search-matching models and (Ravenna and
Walsh (2007)) for a recent application of search frictions in New Keynesiam models.
4troduce labour market frictions in the formal sector, but we do not explicitly model the
matching process as in these papers. Rather we follow another modelling option favoured
in the literature by introducing a wage norm in the formal sector. While we explore the
general equilibrium features of informality, our model is in line with the Harris and Todaro
tradition (Harris and Todaro, 1970) in describing a very simple labour market structure
where labour in the formal sector is ﬁxed at a higher than the market clearing level. See
also Marjit and Kar (2008) and Agenor and Montiel (1996) for a similar assumption. As
discussed in Satchi and Temple (2009) a richer labour market structure implies a wage
in the formal sector which is endogenously determined. While this can be a promising
future development we believe the simplifying assumption allows us to obtain interesting
conclusions without adding further complications to the already complex modelling frame-
work. In this respect, we should also mention that, following the critics on the inability of
the search matching model to generate the observed unemployment volatility as reported
in Shimer (2005), a series of papers depart from the ﬂexible wage assumption in order
to generate enough volatility in the unemployment rate (see Blanchard and Gali (2007),
Krause and Lubik (2007) and Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005)). The introduction of a real
wage norm in New Keynesian models has been described as one of the possible way to
reconcile the model with the data. 4
As clariﬁed in Zenou’s paper “.. in the informal sector, either people are self-employed
or work with relatives or friends and thus do not apply formally for jobs posted in news-
papers or employment agency”. As in Zenou (2008) we do not model this idea explicitly,
but our competitive informal labour market implies free-entry and an instantaneous hiring
process. Zenou’s framework has no NK features and focuses on the evaluation of various
labour market policies on the unemployment rate of an economy with an informal sector.
Our paper contribution to this literature is as follows. We look at the eﬃcacy of
monetary policy and for this reason we require a more general framework where households’
consumption and leisure decisions are explicitly modelled in a DSGE model with price
rigidity. We introduce New Keynesian price rigidities in the usual way, as in Castillo and
Montoro (2008), but then proceed to analyse the interaction of informal and formal sectors
and the implications for monetary policy. Our analysis of simple optimized Taylor-type
interest rate rules, the incorporation of zero-lower bound constraint and the comparison
between simple and optimal rules where one sector is unobserved are particularly novel
4However the introduction of such real wage rigidity is not immune of critics. Thomas (2008) introduces
staggered nominal wages and points to a series of advantages of his approach with respect to the real wage
norm assumption while Hornstein et al. (2005) and Pissarides (2008) claim that wage rigidity needs to be
accompanied by an unrealistic assumption on the labour share and points instead at the introduction of
demand shocks as a possible solution to the unemployment volatility puzzle.
5features for the informal economy literature.
3 The Model
Consider a two-sector “Formal” (F) and “Informal” (I) economy, producing diﬀerent goods
with diﬀerent technologies which sell at diﬀerent retail prices, PF,t and PI,t, say. Labour
and capital are the variable factor inputs and the informal sector is less capital intensive.
In both F and I sectors competitive wholesale ﬁrms supply a homogeneous good (in that
sector) to a monopolistic retail sector. The latter convert the homogeneous good in a
diﬀerentiated product that is sold above its marginal cost. In a free-entry equilibrium,
monopolistic proﬁts are driven down to the conversion costs so all ﬁrms, wholesale or
retail, F or I, make zero proﬁts and are indiﬀerent as to which sector they operate.
Government services are provided from the formal sector and is ﬁnanced by an employ-
ment tax as in Zenou (2008). In the general set-up this can be shared by the formal and
informal sectors giving us a framework in which the role of tax incidence can be studied
as one of the drivers of informalization. The other drivers in our model are the degree
of real wage rigidity in the formal sector and the credit constraints facing the informal
sector. But ﬁrst we set out a model without these latter two frictions in the labour and
ﬁnancial markets.
3.1 The Model without Labour and Credit Market Frictions
3.1.1 Households
A proportion nF,t of household members work in the formal sector. Hours hF,t and hours
hI,t are supplied in the F and I sectors respectively. Members who work in sector i = I,F
derive utility U(Ct,Li,t) where Ct is household shared consumption and leisure Li,t =
1   hi,t and we assume that5
UC > 0, UL > 0, UCC  0, ULL  0 (1)
. The representative household single-period utility is
Λt = Λ(Ct,nF,t,hF,t,hI,t) = nF,tU(Ct,1   hF,t) + (1   nF,t)U(Ct,1   hI,t) (2)
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where Rn,t is the nominal interest rate over the interval [t,t + 1] for riskless bonds set
by the central bank at the beginning of the period. Note that substituting (6) and (7)
into (3) gives (4), so that (4) or (3) are superﬂuous for the set-up. Total labour supply is
found by equating the marginal rate of substitution between labour and leisure with the













For the moment there are no labour market frictions so we have WI,t = WF,t = Wt,
say. It follows from (8) that LI,t = LF,t and hI,t = hF,t = ht, say.
3.1.2 Capital Producing Firms
It is convenient to introduce capital producing ﬁrms that at time t convert It of output
into (1   S(Xt))It of new capital sold at a real price Qt. The law of motion of capital is
then given by









Dt,t+k [Qt+k(1   S (It+k/It+k−1))It+k   It+k]
where Dt,t+k is the real stochastic discount rate. This results in the ﬁrst-order condition









Up to a ﬁrst order approx this is the same as












Wholesale output in the two sectors is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function
Y W
i,t = F(Ai,t,Ni,t,Ki,t), i = I,F (14)
where Ai,t are a technology, total labour supply Ni,t = ni,thi,t, i = I,F. Capital inputs
are Ki,t, i = I,F and we assume capital is accumulated from formal output only.
The ﬁrst-order condition for labour demand are
PW
F,tFNF,t = WF,t + PtτF,t (15)
PW




I,t are wholesale prices, τF,t, τF,t are the employment real tax rates in
the formal sector and informal sectors respectively.
Demand for capital by ﬁrms must satisfy





Pt FKF,t+1 + (1   δ)Qt+1
]
Qt







Pt FKI,t+1 + (1   δ)Qt+1
]
Qt
 Et[1 + Rk
I,t+1] (18)
In (18) the rhs is the expected gross return to holding a unit of capital in from t to t + 1
in the two sectors prespectively. The lhs is the expected gross return from holding bonds,
the opportunity cost of capital.
3.1.4 Retail Firms
We now introduce a retail sector of monopolistic ﬁrms within each sector buying wholesale
goods and diﬀerentiating the product at a proportional resource cost ciY W
i,t in sectors
i = F,I. In a free-entry equilibrium proﬁts are driven to zero. Retail output for ﬁrm f in
sector is then Yi,t(f) = (1 ci)Y W
i,t (f) where Y W
i,t is produced according to the production
technology (14) at prices PW
i,t . Let the number of diﬀerentiated varieties produced in the
informal and formal sectors be νF and νI respectively. Each is produced by a single retail
ﬁrm and the numbers of these ﬁrms is ﬁxed.6 Let CF,t(f) and CI,t(f) denote the home
6This model structure closely follows a model of two interacting economies in the New Open Economy
Literature.
8consumption of the representative household of variety f produced in sectors F and I.

































where ζF,ζI > 1 are the elasticities of substitution between varieties in the two sectors.














































and inter-sector decisions are as before.
We introduce endogenous investment, It, and exogenous government spending Gt both
assumed to consist entirely of formal output. Then maximizing the investment and gov-













Using (19)–(22) it follows that total demands for each diﬀerentiated product are given
by























9Retail ﬁrms follow Calvo pricing. In sector i = F,I, assume that there is a probability
of 1   ξi at each period that the price of each good f is set optimally to ˆ Pi,t(f). If the
price is not re-optimized, then it is held constant.7 For each producer f the objective is







ˆ Pi,t(f)   Pi,t+kMCi,t+k
]
where Dt,t+k is the discount factor over the interval [t,t+k], subject to a downward sloping

















and by the law of large numbers the evolution of the price index is given by
P
1−ζi
i,t+1 = ξi (Pi,t)
1−ζi + (1   ξi)( ˆ Pi,t+1(f))1−ζi (26)
These summations can be expressed as diﬀerence equations as follows. First deﬁne for
i = I,F, Πi,t 
Pi;t
Pi;t 1 = πi,t + 1. Then from the Euler equation we have that Dt+k,t =
βk UC;t+k























where MSi,t is an exogenous mark-up shock in sector i = I,F.8
3.1.5 Equilibrium
Assuming Cobb-Douglas technology in the wholesale sectors (see all functional forms be-
low) for each diﬀerentiated product in the F and I sectors we equate supply and demand
7Thus we can interpret
1
1 i as the average duration for which prices are left unchanged in sector
i = F;I.
8These shocks are scaled in the calibration so that a one standard deviation impulse response leads to
an immediate 1% rise in inﬂation – see the linearized form of the Phillips curves, (C.10) and (C.11).
10in the retail sectors to give












using (23) and (24). Then solving for Ni,t, i = F,I and deﬁning aggregate employment-
hours in each sector by Ni,t =
∑νi





















is a measure of the price dispersion across ﬁrms in sector i = F,I. Then the aggregate
equilibrium conditions in each retail sector are
YF,t = CF,t + It + Gt
(1   S(Xt))It = Kt+1   (1   δ)Kt
Kt = KF,t + KI,t
YI,t = CI,t
with aggregate production functions (29).
Given government spending Gt, technology Ai,t, mark-up shocks MSi,t, the nominal
interest rate Rn,t, the real wage norm RWt and choice of numeraire, the above system
deﬁnes a general equilibrium in Ct, Pt, Pi,t, PW
i,t , Ci,t, hF,t, hI,t, WF,t, WI,t, ni,t, Yi,t =
(1   ci)Y W
i,t and ˆ Pi,t for i = I,F.
3.1.6 Monetary Policy and Government Budget Constraint
Monetary policy is conducted in terms of the nominal interest rate Rn,t set at the beginning
of period t. The expected real interest rate over the interval [t,t + 1] is given by






In what follows we consider interest rate policy in the form of ad hoc Taylor-type rules,
optimized Taylor rules, optimal commitment rules and ﬁnally discretionary policy.
Fiscal policy for the moment assumes a balanced budget constraint in which and
employment tax on only formal ﬁrms, τt, ﬁnances government spending. This takes the
form
PF,tGt = Pt(nF,thF,tτF,t + nI,thI,tτI,t)
11noting that government services are provided out of formal output. In general, a tax rule
τI,t = kτF,t ; k 2 [0,1]
allows for the possibility that some tax can be collected in the informal economy.
3.1.7 Price Dispersion
Finally for second-order terms that aﬀect the welfare, we need to include price dispersion
in the retail output. The production function for retail ﬁrm j in terms of its input of the
homogeneous wholesale good is given by
Yi,t(j) = (1   ci)Y W
i,t (j) = (1   ci)(Ai,tNi,t(j))αiKi,t(j)1−αi ; i = I,F (31)
where Ni,t(j) and Ki,t(j) are labour and capital inputs into the wholesale sector required









Ki;t(j) + (1   δ)Qt
Qt−1
where we note that the return Rk
i,t and prices PW
i,t , Pt and Qt are all independent of j.















which again is independent of j. Now we can write (31) as
Yi,t(j) = (1   ci)Ai,tNi,t(j))KY
1 i
i
i,t ; i = I,F






and deﬁning total labour supply for sector i as Ni,t 
∑



























In fact writing aggregate wholesale output as
Y W
i,t = (1   ci)(Ai,tNi,t)αiK
1−αi
i,t ; i = I,F (35)
(33) simply becomes
Yi,t =
(1   ci)Y W
i,t
∆i,t
; i = I,F
3.1.8 Functional Forms
We choose a Cobb-Douglas production function, AR(1) processes for labour-augmenting
productivity (LAP), government spending and mark-up shocks and a utility function con-




logAi,t   log ¯ Ai,t = ρAi(logAi,t−1   log ¯ Ai,t−1) + ϵAi,t








; σ > 1









= 1 + g
S(X) = ϕX(Xt   (1 + g))2
where ϵAi,t,ϵGi,t, ID with zero mean. The choice of utility function in (36) is chosen to
be consistent with a steady state balanced growth path (henceforth BGP) where LAP ¯ At
and ¯ Gt are time-varying. As pointed out in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), chapter 9,
this requires a careful choice of the form of the utility as a function of consumption and
labour eﬀort. It is achieved by a utility function which is non-separable in consumption
and leisure unless σ = 1. A utility function of the form (36) achieves this. The marginal
utilities are then then given by

















133.2 The Model with Labour and Credit Market Frictions
We allow in general for the the real wage in the F-sector to be a combination of an








Pt , it follows from ULL < 0 that the household will choose less leisure and
more work eﬀort in the F-sector; i.e., hF,t > hI,F. Household members would prefer to
be employed in the F-sector at the higher wage rate; but all those who fail to do so ﬁnd
employment at the the market-clearing wage rate in the I-sector.
We can model the risk premium rigorously by introducing a ﬁnancial accelerator in
each sector. The main ingredient is an external ﬁnance premium Θi,t  1 such that the
expected cost of borrowing in sector i = I,F is given by







; s′() < 0 (39)
In (39), Ni,t is net worth in sector iand Qt−1Ki,t Ni,t is the external ﬁnancing requirement.
Thus
Qt 1Ki;t−Ni;t
Ni;t is the leverage ratio and thus (38) and (39) state that the cost of capital
is an increasing function of this ratio.
Assume that entrepreneurs in the sector i exit with a given probability 1   ϕi. Then
the net worth accumulates according to
Ni,t+1 = ϕiVi,t + (1   ϕi)Di,t
where Di,t are transfers from exiting to newly entering entrepreneurs continuing, and Vi,t,
the net value carried over from the previous period, is given by
Vi,t = (1 + Rk
i,t)Qt−1Ki,t   Θi,t(1 + Rt)(Qt−1Ki,t   Ni,t)
where Rk





Pt FKi + (1   δ)Qt
Qt−1
Demand for capital in sector i = I,F is then given by





Pt+1 FKi,t+1 + (1   δ)Qt+1
]
Qt
 Et[1 + Rk
i,t+1]






must be added to total consumption.











where RPSt is an exogenous risk premium shock that is common to both sectors.9
4 Steady State Analysis and Model Calibration








= (1 + g)((1−ϱ)(1−σ)−1)
using (37). Thus from (5)
1 + Rn = 1 + R =
(1 + g)1+(σ−1)(1−ϱ)
β
nI + nF = 1
P =
[
w(PF)1−µ + (1   w)(PI)1−µ] 1
1 
¯ Yi,t = (1   ci)(nihi ¯ Ai,t)αi ¯ K
1−αi

















+ 1   nF
) = ¯ WI,t
αiPW
I ¯ Y W
i,t
Pnihi
= ¯ Wi,t + ¯ τi,t  ¯ Wi,t(1 + τi,t); i = F,I
¯ WF,t = ( ¯ RWt)1−ω( ¯ WI,t)ω
9In a subsequent comparison of the models with and without ﬁnancial frictions we will retain this shock
in the latter model as a ‘real interest rate shock’.
15P ¯ Ki,t
PW





; i = I,F
¯ It = (δ + g)( ¯ KI,t + ¯ KF,t)
¯ Ni,t =
(1   ϕi) ¯ DF,t
(1   ϕi(1 + Ri))
; i = I,F (40)
















( ¯ Ct + ¯ Ce
I,t + ¯ Ce
F,t)





( ¯ Ct + ¯ Ce
I,t + ¯ Ce
F,t) + ¯ It + ¯ Gt
PF
P
¯ Gt = nFhF ¯ τF,t + nIhI¯ τI,t
¯ τi,t = τi ¯ Wi,t ; i = F,I







where consumption, technical LAP, the real wage and tax rates, and government spending
(all indicated by ¯ Xt) are growing at a common growth rate.
We impose a free entry condition on retail ﬁrms in this steady state which drives
monopolistic proﬁts to zero. This implies that costs of converting wholesale to retail
goods are given by
ci = 1/ζi
which implies that:
Pi¯ Yi,t = PW
i ¯ Y W
i,t ; i = F,I
Given exogenous trends for ¯ Ai,t and ¯ Gt, the tax rates and RWt, the above system
of equations give 21 relationships in 22 variables R, P, PF, PI, PW
F , PW
I , ¯ Ct, ¯ CF,t, ¯ CI,t,
¯ YF,t, ¯ YI,t, ¯ WI,t, ¯ WF,t, nI, nF, hI, hF, ¯ I, ¯ KF ¯ KI , ¯ τF,t, ¯ τI,t. One of the prices (it is conve-
nient to choose P) can be chosen as the numeraire, so the system is determinate.
4.1 Model Calibration
Turning to the calibration, the idea is to assume an observed baseline steady state equi-
librium in the presence of some observed policy. We then use this observed equilibrium
16to solve for model parameters consistent with this observation For this baseline and for
the purpose of calibration only, it is convenient to choose units of retail output such that





















We can choose units of labour supply hI so that ¯ AI = 1, but the choice of AF must be
consistent with the choice of unitary prices.
Our baseline steady state can be described in terms of a vector X = f(θ) of outcomes
where θ is a vector of parameters. The calibration strategy is to choose a subset X1 of n
observed outcomes to calibrate a subset θ1 of n parameters. Partition X = [X1,X2] and
θ = [θ1,θ2]. Then θ1 is then found by solving
[X1,X2] = f([θ1,θ2])
for X2 and θ1, given X1 and θ2. If such a solution exists for economically meaningful
parameter values for θ1 then a successful calibration has been achieved.
We now calibrate the parameters θ1 = [ϱ,w,β,αI] given observations X1 = [nF,
 YF;t
 YI;t ,hF,R].
The given the government share of formal output gyF, ¯ Gt is given by
 Gt
 YF;t  gyF. ¯ AF is
then determined by the normalization of unitary prices. Imposed parameters found from
micro-econometric studies are σ, rw and δ and the long-run growth rate g chosen to
correspond to 5% per year. The results of this calibration are summarized in Table 1.












Suppose we can obtain χi from econometric studies and we have data on the risk premium
Θi = 1+Ri











deﬁning nk,  Ni




Then in the baseline steady state used to calibrate parameters, we put ¯ Ni,t = nk,i ¯ Ki,t and
calibrate ¯ Di from (40).
Data on emerging economies can be obtained from IMF, World Bank and ILO statis-
tics. As discussed in Neumeyer and Perri (2004) real interest rates in emerging economies
17are very volatile and diﬃcult to calculate. Though nominal interest rate statistics are usu-
ally reported by local Central Banks, due to the high variability of inﬂation in emerging
economies, the calculation of the real interest rate in EMEs countries is often cumbersome
and not reliable. For this reason the authors calculate the real interest rate from a com-
bination of government bonds (Argentina) and dollar denominated bonds index (EMBI)
constructed by J.P. Morgan. In this way real interest rates can be computed without
relying on expected inﬂation rates. For example, the average real interest rate per year
for Argentina is 14.5%. We choose a value 8% for our calibration. Also GDP growth
rates diﬀer considerably among EMEs countries. Neumeyer and Perri (2004) reports an
annual growth rate for Argentina of 2.5% in a period range from 1984 to 2002. We can use
this average growth rate and consider Argentina our representative country or calculate
an average among EMEs in Latin America, Asia and Transitional Economies. The World
Development Indicators published by the World Bank shows an annual growth rate for
2007 of 5.8% for Latin American countries, 9.1% for India and 6% for the Czech Repub-
lic (average selected EMEs countries = 7%). We choose a value of GDP annual growth
rate of 6% keeping in mind there are large diﬀerences among EMEs countries and period
considered. 10 growth rate We refer to LABSTAT (ILO) for the calculation of hours of
work in emerging economies and choose h=45/100 and to ILO (2002) for data on formal
and informal output relobs = 7/3 as reported in table 2.8 of the ILO’s report. Data on
government shares can be obtained from diﬀerent sources such as IMF and World Bank.
We choose World Bank and calculate an average for selected EMEs countries to obtain
a value equal to 15%. 11 For values of wage mark-up in the formal sector, we refer to
Perry et al. (2007) where Latin American data are reported. Table 3.1 shows that, on
average, informal salaried workers earn between 40 to 66 percent less than formal salaried
workers. Looking at this ﬁgures, we choose a mark-up of 50%. Finally, data on the formal
sector employment as reported in various ILO’s documents range from 60 percent to 35%
in selected EMEs countries with a particular low level of 15 percent in India. We choose
a value of 50% which is also consistent with Sparts (2003) for Bolivia (table 4).
10Note that this is less than the steady-state real interest rate ensuring a binding intertemporal solvency
constraint for households and government.














PREMI  RI   R 0.057
PREMF  RF   R 0.012




























19This completes the calibration of the parameters describing the deterministic parame-
ters. There are currently two exogenous shocks in the model to labour productivity in both
sectors and government spending. In the linearized model of Appendix A these are denoted
respectively by ai,t and gi,t, i = I,F. We also add mark-up shocks to the linearized Phillips
Curves ui,t, i = I,F. Again following the literature we assume AR(1) processes with cali-
brated persistence parameters 0.7 for the technology and demand shocks. Mark-up shocks
are assumed to be transient. The standard deviations of the innovation processes are
taken to be unity, but later we examine more volatile economies with a standard deviation
k > 1. This completes the calibration; observations, imposed and calibrated parameters
are summarized in Table 1.
Figure 2 shows this process of informalization for diﬀerent degrees of wage rigidity and
illustrates how an increase in this friction coupled with a lack of tax-smoothing drives
down the size of the formal sector. For example, with k = 0 and no friction the size of
the formal sector is close to nF = 0.82. When rw = 0.75, this halves, falling to under
nF = 0.4.
Figure 3 shows the welfare eﬀects on a representative household as the tax burden is
smoothed over the two sectors. As k approaches unity the utility becomes very ﬂat and
close to the optimum. We can work out the equivalent permanent increase in consumption
implied by this optimum by ﬁrst computing the increase from a 1% consumption change
at any point on the balanced growth trend as nFU(1.01  ¯ Ct,LF) + (1   nF)U( ¯ Ct,LI)
at some time t = 0 say. In our best steady state equilibrium for rw = 0.5 at k = 1,
this works out as 0.0059, so any increase in welfare DΛ implies a consumption equivalent
ce = D
0.0059%. For the transition between k = 1 to k = 0 with rw = 0.5 in Figure 2 this
implies a utility loss ce = 4.38%.








































Figure 2: The Size of Formal Sector and Tax Burden: k = Ratio of Informal-
Formal Tax Rates. rw =wage mark-up in the formal sector.
























Figure 3: Welfare and Tax Burden: k = Ratio of Informal-Formal Tax Rates.
rw =wage mark-up in the formal sector.
215 Optimal Stabilization Policy and Potential Gains from
Commitment
We adopt a linear-quadratic framework for the optimization problem facing the monetary
authority. This is particularly convenient as we can then summarize outcomes in terms of
unconditional (asymptotic) variances of macroeconomic variables and the local stability
and determinacy of particular rules. The framework also proves useful for addressing the
issue of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
We pose the central question: how does informality aﬀect monetary policy? To answer
this question we compare outcomes under welfare-optimal monetary policy, discretion and
welfare-optimized Taylor rules in three models: ﬁrst as a benchmark we examine our
two-sector NK model with no frictions in labour and credit markets, model I. We then
proceed to model II with frictions in only the formal labour market and ﬁnally model
III with frictions on both credit markets and the formal labour market.
5.1 LQ Approximation of the Optimization Problem
In our models there are three sets of distortions that result in the steady state output being
below the social optimum: namely, from monopolistic competition, from distortionary
taxes and from the labour and credit frictions. We cannot assume that these distortions
are small in the steady state and use the ‘small distortions’ (Woodford (2003)), quadratic
approximation to the household’s single period utility which is accurate in the vicinity of
our zero-inﬂation steady state. Our computations use the large distortions approximation
to this welfare function as described in Levine et al. (2008a) and summarized in Appendix
C. However it is instructive to see the form of the ‘small distortions’ approximation to the
loss function in a simpler case of the model without capital.
The small distortions approximation is found by approximating the utility function
Ut = U(Ct,Lt) in consumption, Ct and leisure Lt = 1   ht subject to the resource con-
straint. We start with the Taylor Series expansion about the BGP steady state12








t + higher order terms (42)
Next we write ct = wcF,t + (1   w)cI,t, lt =   h
1−h
ˆ ht and use the linearized resource
constraints
yF,t = aF,t + αF(ˆ nF,t + ˆ ht)   dF,t = (1   gFy)cF,t + gFygt
yI,t = aI,t + αF(ˆ nI,t + ˆ ht)   dI,t = cI,t







;i = I,F (43)
and ∆i,t is the price dispersion eﬀect given by (34). By standard results (see, for example,
Gali (2008), p88) di,t is a second order term given by
di,t =
ζi(αi + (1   αi)ζi)
2αi










i,t ;i = I,F (45)
Then using the linearized resource constraints and the properties of eﬃciency in the
steady state: UL
UC = FNF = FNI the ﬁrst order terms in ct and lt disappear in (42) and we


















Finally using the results (43)–(46) we can write the quadratic form of the intertemporal









t + whIˆ h2















(1 + ϱ(σ   1))h2
(1   ϱ)(1   h)2 ; h = hI,hF
wπF = w
ζF(αF + (1   αF)ζF)
cFyαFλF
wπI =




(1   βξi)(1   ξi)
; i = F,I
To work out the welfare in terms of a consumption equivalent percentage increase,
expanding U(C,L) as a Taylor series, a 1% permanent increase in consumption of 1 per cent
yields a ﬁrst-order welfare increase UCC  0.01. Since standard deviations are expressed
in terms of percentages, the welfare loss terms which are proportional to the covariance
matrix (and pre-multiplied by 1/2) are of order 10−4. The losses reported in the paper
in the subsections that follow are scaled by a factor 1   β. Letting ∆Ω be these losses
relative to the optimal policy, then ce = ∆Ω  0.01%.
235.2 Imposition of the ZLB Constraint
We can modify welfare criterion so as to approximately impose an interest rate zero lower
bound (ZLB) so that this event hardly ever occurs. Our quadratic approximation to the




t]′ and Q is a
symmetric matrix. As in Woodford (2003), chapter 6, the ZLB constraint is implemented
by modifying the single period welfare loss to Lt + wrr2
n,t. Then following Levine et al.
(2008b), the policymaker’s optimization problem is to choose wr and the unconditional
distribution for rn,t (characterized by the steady state variance) shifted to the right about
a new non-zero steady state inﬂation rate and a higher nominal interest rate, such that
the probability, p, of the interest rate hitting the lower bound is very low.13 This is
implemented by calibrating the weight wr for each of our policy rules so that z0(p)σr < Rn
where z0(p) is the critical value of a standard normally distributed variable Z such that
prob (Z  z0) = p, Rn = 1
β(1+guc)   1 + π∗  Rn(π∗) is the steady state nominal interest
rate, σ2
r = var(rn) is the unconditional variance and π∗ is the new steady state inﬂation
rate. Given σr the steady state positive inﬂation rate that will ensure rn,t  0 with
probability 1   p is given by14
π∗ = max[z0(p)σr   Rn(0)  100,0] (48)
In our linear-quadratic framework we can write the intertemporal expected welfare loss
at time t = 0 as the sum of stochastic and deterministic components, Ω0 = ˜ Ω0 + ¯ Ω0.
Note that ¯ Ω0 incorporates in principle the new steady state values of all the variables;
however the NK Phillips curve being almost vertical, the main extra term comes from the
π2
F,t and π2
I,t terms in the loss function seen clearly in (47) for the small distortions case.
By increasing wr we can lower σr thereby decreasing π∗ and reducing the deterministic
component, but at the expense of increasing the stochastic component of the welfare loss.
By exploiting this trade-oﬀ, we then arrive at the optimal policy that, in the vicinity of
the steady state, imposes the ZLB constraint, rt  0 with probability 1   p.
5.3 Gains from Commitment Compared Across Models
We ﬁrst assess the potential (maximum) gains from commitment by comparing the optimal
commitment policy with discretionary policy, both subject to the constraint that the ZLB
13The idea that the ZLB should be avoided by choosing a long-run inﬂation rate rate so as increase the
corresponding long-run interest rate and make room for an active interest rate rule at all times has been
put forward recently by Blanchard et al. (2010).
14If the ineﬃciency of the steady-state output is negligible, then 
  0 is a credible new steady state
inﬂation rate. Note that in our LQ framework, the zero interest rate bound is very occasionally hit in
which case the interest rate is allowed to become negative.










































































Minimum at (18.5, 35.81)



































































































































































Figure 4: Commitment: Imposing the ZLB Constraint
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Figure 5: Discretion: Imposing the ZLB Constraint
26is reached with a very small probability p. In a quarterly model we choose p = 0.0025 or
an expected frequency of hitting the ZLB every 100 years. All shocks are AR(1) processes
and we calibrate their standard deviations in deviation form about the steady state as 1%
and the persistence parameters as 0.5.
Figures 4 and 5 show how the ZLB is imposed for commitment and discretion. In the
ﬁgures on the lhs we see that as the penalty on the nominal interest rate volatility wr in
the single-period loss function is increased, then unconditional variance σ2
r falls and with
it the steady-state inﬂation rate π∗ given by (48) also falls. The graphs on the rhs show
the rising stochastic loss function that subtracts the interest rate penalty how, the falling
deterministic loss function arising from the positive steady state inﬂation rate, and the
sum of these two, Ω0, that falls and eventually reaches a minimum. This minimum, to-
gether with σ2
r and π∗ is shown in table 3 for models I, II and III for both commitment and
discretion. The consumption equivalent percentage loss ce relative to the best outcome,
the model I commitment case, is also computed.
Model Policy Frictions Ω0 σ2
r π∗ ce(%)
I Commit Product 35.8 0.684 0.074 0
I Discretion Product 211.5 0.734 0.155 1.76
II Commit Product, Labour 60.3 0.678 0.064 0.25
II Discretion Product, Labour 185.0 0.680 0.068 1.49
III Commit Product, Labour, Credit 90.4 0.657 0.027 0.55
III Discretion Product, Labour, Credit 292.6 2.26 1.97 2.56
Table 2. Optimal Rules with and without Commitment
A number of notable results emerge from table 2. First, as noted in Levine et al.
(2008b) the gains from commitment with ZLB considerations are signiﬁcant and vary be-
tween ce = 1.76% in model I with no labour or ﬁnancial market frictions to ce = 2.26%
in model III with such frictions. Interestingly in model II where the real wage in the
F-sector is ﬁxed at ite real norm the gains from commitment actually fails. The intuition
here is straightforward: with the real wage in the F-sector ﬁxed, the incentive to tackle
the product market friction by engaging in a surprise inﬂation that lowers the real wage
and increases output in the vicinity of a steady state that is below the eﬃcient output
level is less than in model I. In model III with credit market frictions the inability of the
policymaker lacking commitment and the ability to inﬂuence private sector behaviour with
promises of future interest rate changes becomes critical. The time inconsistency problem
worsens and with it the gain from commitment. The steady state inﬂation rate needed to
27give room for interest rate changes rises to almost 2% per quarter, a level of inﬂation that
is typical of emerging economies. It should be stressed that these commitment gains are
for shocks with standard deviations all calibrated at 1%. If shocks are say 2%, then the
consumption equivalent ﬁgures will increase by at least fourfold, when the ZLB constraint
is imposed. Similarly if the persistence of shocks increases from it present calibration of
0.5 to 0.75, then welfare gains increase by at least a factor 1−0.52
1−0.752 = 1.714, so with a not
implausible calibration, these commitment gains can become quite considerable, especially
for model III.
Model aF,t (%) aI,t (%) gt (%) msF,t (%) msI,t (%) rpst (%) Total (%)
I 2.15 0.56 0.19 88.47 1.19 7.42 100
II 1.69 0.42 0.17 92.06 0.87 4.77 100
III 1.12 0.31 0.10 86.31 0.01 11.27 100
Table 3. Welfare Decomposition under Optimal Policy
Finally Table 3 shocks how six exogenous shocks contribute to the welfare loss under
optimal policy for the three models. By far the most important shock in this respect is the
mark-up shock in the F-sector, msF,t, then comes the risk premium shock rpst followed
by the technology shock in the F-sector aF,t. This decomposition contrasts with the RBC
model which is at the core of our NK model and arrived at by stripping the latter of its
nominal features with price stickiness. It is the latter and its eﬀect on welfare that leads
to dominant eﬀect of mark-up shocks that in eﬀect are shocks to inﬂation.
6 Optimized Taylor Commitment Rules
We consider symmetrical and asymmetrical interest rate Taylor commitment rules that
respond to deviations of inﬂation and the output gap15 in both formal and informal sectors
and we allow for a degree of interest rate smoothing. Symmetrical rules are hypothetical
in the sense that they require the full visibility of inﬂation and output in the I-sector.
Asymmetrical rules require only data for F-sector output and aggregate inﬂation and are
implementable. The comparison between these two forms of rules enable us to assess the
welfare costs of the lack of visibility for the I-sector and these are part of the costs of
15In fact our measure of the output gap is simply the log-deviation about the steady state. We choose
this form of rules to avoid problems the monetary would have observing the true output gap. In fact some
experimentation suggests using the latter would make little diﬀerence to our results.
28informality.16 We write the rules in log-linear form as:
rn,t = ρrn,t−1 + θπFπF,t + θπIπI,t + θIyyI,t ; θπF, θπI, θFy, θIy > 0 (49)
rn,t = ρrn,t−1 + θππt + θFyyF,t ; θπ > 0 (50)
and we compute optimal parameter values that optimize Ω0.
We now wish to address three questions. First can the optimized Taylor rule mimic
the fully optimal commitment rule? Second, what are the costs of being constrained to
an implementable asymmetric rule? Third, what form do the optimized rules take as
we proceed from model I with no labour and credit market frictions to model III with
these features? The results for the optimized Taylor rule are displayed in Table 4. The
consumption equivalent changes in utility are again measured relative to the best outcome
which is the optimal policy in model I. Thus ce = 0 in this case.
Model Rule [ρ, θπF, θπI, θyF, θyI] Ω0 σ2
r π∗ ce(%)
I Sym TR [1.00, 0.538, 0.000, 0.270, 0.161] 59.4 0.12 0 0.24
I Asym TR [0.953, 0.024, 0, 0.024, 0] 115.7 0.01 0 0.80
I Optimal Complex 35.8 0.684 0.074 0
II Sym TR [1.00, 0.428, 0.013, 0.400, 0.642] 86.4 0.14 0 0.51
II Asym TR [0.663, 0.337, 0, 0.000, 0] 127.8 0.42 0 0.92
II Optimal Complex 185.0 0.680 0.068 0.25
III Sym TR [0.732, 0.321, 0.027, 0.069, 0.042] 101.4 0.69 0.083 0.66
III Asym TR [0.871, 0.327, 0, 0.022, 0] 132.5 0.70 0.102 0.97
III Optimal Complex 90.4 0.657 0.027 0.55
Table 4. Optimized Taylor Rules Compared with Optimal Policy
The ﬁrst result that emerges from table 4 is that the ZLB constraint does not bind
for our simple rules for models I and II without ﬁnancial frictions. Simplicity restricts the
monetary authority from responding to all aspects of the economy and so keeps interest
rate volatility low, at least for models I and II. In response to the questions we have posed,
the costs of simplicity are measures as the diﬀerences between the optimal and simple rules
for each model. For the hypothetical symmetrical rule these are in the range 0.11  0.24%
of consumption equivalent but rise to 0.42  0.80% for implementable asymmetrical rules.
Interestingly the costs do not rise as frictions are added, and in fact fall. But again these
numbers depend on the calibration of the AR(1) shocks where modest standard deviations
16See Batini/etal2010 for a full assessment of the costs and beneﬁts of informality.
29of 1% and persistence parameters of 0.5 were chosen. A plausible higher choice of these
values would see these costs rising by at least a factor 41.71 = 6.8 so costs of simplicity
and lack of visibility of the I-sector can be very high.
Turning to the form of the optimized implementable Taylor rules and how they change
with added frictions. Comparing the asymmetrical rules across the models it is of in-
terest to examine the long-term responses to aggregate inﬂation,
θpi
1−ρ and to output in
the F-sector,
θy
1−ρ. For model I these are 0.51 for both so that the Taylor principle is
violated - ceteris paribus real interest rate fall with a rise in inﬂation - but the economy
is stabilized by allowing the nominal interest rate to respond equally strongly to a rise in
output. When we introduce labour market frictions in model II the long-run responses to
inﬂation and output are 1.003 and 0.000 so the Taylor principle now just holds and there
is no signiﬁcant response to output. Then adding ﬁnancial frictions in model III the cor-
responding responses are 2.53 and 0.17 so now the Taylor principle is easily satisﬁed and
accompanied by a more modest response to output than in model I. The overall picture
is that frictions require an increasingly aggressive response of the interest rate to inﬂation
to mitigate shocks that are not dampened by changes in the real wage (model II) and to
oﬀset the ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect in model III.
We ﬁnally seek an improvement on the asymmetric Taylor rule by allowing monetary
policy to also respond, data permitting, to the risk premium θF,t in the formal sector in
model III. The rule now takes the form
rn,t = ρrn,t−1 + θππt + θFyyF,t   θFθθF,t ; θπ, θFy, θFθ > 0 (51)
Model Rule [ρ, θπF, θyF, θθF] Ω0 σ2
r π∗ ce
III Asym TR [0.931, 0.169, 0.000, 0.076] 101.00 0.08 0 0.65
Table 5. Optimized Taylor Rule Responding to the F-sector Risk Premium
The result is shown in Table 5. We now have long-run responses to inﬂation, output
and the risk-premium of 2.45, 0.00 and 1.10 respectively. This more than one-to-one
long-run response of the nominal interest rate to changes in the risk-premium brings
about a signiﬁcant welfare improvement in the outcome of ce = 0.32%. Again with less
conservative estimates for the size and persistence of the shocks, this improvement can
turn out as considerable.
7 Conclusions
Our main results for the implications of informality for the conduct of monetary policy are
as follows. First labour and ﬁnancial market frictions, the latter assumed to be stronger
30in the I-sector, cause the time-inconsistency problem to worsen. The importance of com-
mitment therefore increases in economies with a large informal sector with the features we
have highlighted. Simple implementable optimized rules that respond only to observed ag-
gregate inﬂation and F-sector output can be signiﬁcantly worse in welfare terms than their
optimal counterpart, but are still far better than discretion. Simple rules that respond, if
possible, to the risk premium in the F-sector result in a signiﬁcant welfare improvement.
We conclude by discussing a number of caveats and possible directions for future
research. Inevitably our results are dependent on our modelling strategy and choice of
calibration. Whilst some results not reported suggest that our conclusions are not too
sensitive to the latter, there remains the question of alternative models. We have chosen
to model labour market frictions as a real wage norm in the Harris-Todaro tradition, but
as we discuss in the review of the literature a search-match approach that endogenizes the
bargained real wage would pose an interesting alternative. Our model is closed - in the
open economy the issue of liability dollarization becomes an important issue giving the
ﬁnacial accelerator more bite (see Batini et al. (2007) and Batini et al. (2009)).
Finally it would be desirable to estimate the model by Bayesian methods as is now
commonplace in the literature. This leads to the need to properly take into account the
lack of observability of this sector in solving for the rational expectations equilibrium and
the estimation. This is not done in this paper, nor indeed in the DSGE literature as a
whole.17 This caveat suggests another important direction for research.
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Appendix
A Expressing Summations as Diﬀerence Equations
In the ﬁrst order conditions for Calvo contracts and expressions for value functions we are con-








where Xt,t+k has the properties Xt,t = 1 and Xt,t+k = Xt,t+1Xt+1,t+k (for example an inﬂation,
interest or discount rate over the interval [t,t + k]).
Lemma
Ωt can be expressed as
Ωt = Yt + βEt [Xt,t+1Ωt+1] (A.2)
Proof





















= Yt + βEt [Xt,t+1Ωt+1] 
34B The Non-Linear Set-up
For i = I,F the benchmark model without labour market or ﬁnancial friction is





F,t + (1   nF,t)L
ϱ(1−σ)






















Li,t  1   hi,t (B.8)
Y W
i,t = F(Ai,t,ni,t,hi,t,Ki,t) = (Ai,tni,thi,t)αiK
1−αi
i,t (B.9)
nF,t + nI,t = 1 (B.10)






































S(Zt) = ϕZ(Zt   (1 + g))2 (B.17)


















YF,t = CF,t + Gt + It (B.19)



































Tt = Tt−1 + ΠI,t   ΠF,t (B.25)
35Hi,t   ξiβEt[Π
ζi−1
































τI,t = kτF,t (B.31)




















logAi,t   log ¯ Ai,t = ρAi(logAi,t−1   log ¯ Ai,t−1) + ϵAi,t (B.34)
logGt   log ¯ Gt = ρG(logGt−1   log ¯ Gt−1) + ϵG,t (B.35)
logMSi,t   logMSi = ρMSi(logMSi,t−1   logMSi) + ϵMSi,t (B.36)
logRPSi,t   logRPSi = ρRPSi(logRPSi,t−1   logRPSi) + ϵRPSi,t (B.37)







RF,t = RI,t = Rt (B.39)
It follows from the household FOC that LF,t = LI,t and hF,t = hI,t. This completes the model.













; s′() < 0 (B.42)
Ni,t+1 = ϕiVi,t + (1   ϕi)Di,t (B.43)
Vi,t = (1 + Rk













t = Ct + Ce
I,t + Ce
F,t (B.46)
18The Dynare code for the full model is available from the authors on request.
36C Linearization
Deﬁne lower case variables xt = log Xt
 Xt if Xt has a long-run trend or xt = log Xt
X otherwise where X












, i = I,F are log-linear gross interest and inﬂation rates.
First consider the model without ﬁnancial frictions. Our linearized model about the BGP
zero-inﬂation steady state then takes the state-space form form
aF,t+1 = ρaFaF,t + εaF,t+1 (C.1)
aI,t+1 = ρaIaI,t + εaI,t+1 (C.2)
gt+1 = ρggt + εg,t+1 (C.3)
uF,t+1 = ρuFuF,t + εuF,t+1 (C.4)
uI,t+1 = ρuIuI,t + εuI,t+1 (C.5)
rpst+1 = ρrpsrpst + εrps,t+1 (C.6)








Et[λC,t+1] = λC,t   Et[rt+1] (C.9)
βEt[πF,t+1] = πF,t   λF(mcF,t + uF,t) (C.10)
βEt[πI,t+1] = πI,t   λI(mcI,t + uI,t) (C.11)











Etit+1 + it−1 +
1
(1 + g)2S′′(1 + g)
qt (C.14)
rF,t = rI,t = rt (C.15)
Outputs are deﬁned by
rt = rn,t−1   πt (C.16)
πt = wπF,t + (1   w)πI,t (C.17)






I )ˆ nF,t + ϱ(1   σ)(nFL
ϱ(1−σ)





F + (1   nF)L
ϱ(1−σ)
I

















wI,t   pt = uLI,t   λC,t (C.23)
ˆ hF,t : wF,t   pt = uLF,t   λC,t (C.24)
wF,t   pt = ω(wI,t   pt) (C.25)
cF,t = ct + µ(1   w)τt (C.26)
cI,t = ct   µwτt (C.27)
ˆ nF,t : yF,t = αF(aF,t + ˆ nF,t + ˆ hF,t) + (1   αF)kF,t (C.28)
ˆ hI,t : yI,t = αI(aI,t + ˆ nI,t + ˆ hI,t) + (1   αI)kI,t (C.29)




mcF,t = wF,t   pt +
τF
1 + τF
ˆ τF,t + (1   w)τt   αFaF,t
+ (1   αF)(ˆ nF,t + ˆ hF,t   kF,t) (C.31)
mcI,t = wI,t   pt +
τI
1 + τI
ˆ τI,t   wτt   αIaI,t
+ (1   αI)(ˆ nI,t + ˆ hI,t   kI,t) (C.32)
yI,t = yW
I,t = cI,t (C.33)
yF,t = yW
F,t = cyFcF,t + iyFit + gyF gt (C.34)
gt =  (1   w)τt +
nFτF
nFτt + nIτI




(ˆ nI,t + ˆ hI,t + ˆ τI,t + wI,t   pt)
ˆ τI,t = ˆ τF,t (C.35)







qt : xF,t = (RF + δ)[yW
F,t   kF,t + mcF,t   (1   w)τt] + (1   δ)qt (C.37)
kI,t : xI,t = (RI + δ)[yW
I,t   kI,t + mcI,t + wτt] + (1   δ)qt (C.38)
xI,t : rI,t = xI,t   qt−1
replaces Et[rI,t+1] = Et[xI,t+1]   qt (C.39)
rF,t = rI,t = rt + rpst (C.40)
where λi 
(1−βξi)(1−ξi)
ξi , and τi   τi
Wt/P i = I,F. Note that (C.18) deﬁnes ct, (C.28) deﬁnes ˆ nF,t
and (C.29) deﬁnes ˆ ht. Let τI = (1   k)τF where k 2 [0,1] to allow taxation to be enforced in the
informal sector. Also (C.26) and (C.27) implies ct = wcF,t + (1   w)cI,t



















i,t = xi,t   qt−1 (C.42)
ri,t = θi,t + rt (C.43)
θi,t = χi(ni,t   ki,t   qt−1) + ϵPi,t (C.44)
ce














t + µ(1   w)τt (C.47)
cI,t = ca
t   µwτt (C.48)
D The Hamiltonian Quadratic Approximation of Welfare




βtU(Xt−1,Wt) s.t. Xt = f(Xt−1,Wt) (D.1)
where Xt−1 is vector of state variables and Wt−1 a vector of instruments.19 There are given initial
and the usual tranversality conditions. For our purposes, we consider this as including models
with forward-looking expectations, so that the optimal solution to the latter setup is the pre-
commitment solution. Suppose the solution converges to a steady state X,W as t ! 1 for the
states Xt and the policies Wt. Deﬁne xt = Xt X and wt = Wt W as representing the ﬁrst-order
approximation to absolute deviations of states and policies from their steady states.20




t (Xt   f(Xt−1,Wt))] (D.2)
19An alternative representation of the problem is U(Xt,Wt) and Et[Xt+1] = f(Xt,Wt) where Xt
includes forward-looking non-predetermined variables and Et[Xt+1] = Xt+1 for the deterministic
problem where perfect foresight applies. Whichever one uses, it is easy to switch from one to the
other by a simple re-deﬁnition. Note that Magill (1977) adopted a continuous-time model without
forward-looking variables. As we demonstrate in Levine et al. (2008b), although the inclusion of
forward-looking variables signiﬁcantly alters the nature of the optimization problem, these changes
only aﬀect the boundary conditions and the second-order conditions, but not the steady state of
the optimum which is all we require for LQ approximation.
20Alternatively xt = (Xt   X)/X and wt = (Wt   W)/W, depending on the nature of the
economic variable. Then the Theorem follows in a similar way with an appropriate adjustment to
the Jacobian Matrix.
39so that a necessary condition for the solution to (D.1) is that the Lagrangian is stationary at all
fXsg, fWsg i.e.
UW + λT





t fX = 0 (D.3)
Assume a steady state λ for the Lagrange multipliers exists as well. Now deﬁne the Hamiltonian
Ht = U(Xt−1,Wt) + λTf(Xt−1,Wt). The following is the discrete time version of Magill (1977):
Theorem: If a steady state solution (X,W,λ) to the optimization problem (D.1) exists, then

















s.t. xt = fXxt−1 + fWwt (D.4)
where HXX, etc denote second-order derivatives evaluated at (X,W). This can be directly ex-
tended to the case incorporating disturbances.
Thus our general procedure is as follows:
1. Set out the deterministic non-linear problem for the Ramsey Problem, to maximize the
representative agents’ utility subject to non-linear dynamic constraints.
2. Write down the Lagrangian for the problem.
3. Calculate the ﬁrst order conditions. We do not require the initial conditions for an optimum
since we ultimately only need the steady-state of the Ramsey problem.
4. Calculate the steady state of the ﬁrst-order conditions. The terminal condition implied by
this procedure is such that the system converges to this steady state.
5. Calculate a second-order Taylor series approximation, about the steady state, of the Hamil-
tonian associated with the Lagrangian in 2.
6. Calculate a ﬁrst-order Taylor series approximation, about the steady state, of the ﬁrst-order
conditions and the original constraints.
7. Use 4. to eliminate the steady-state Lagrangian multipliers in 5. By appropriate elimination
both the Hamiltonian and the constraints can be expressed in minimal form. This then
gives us the accurate LQ approximation of the original non-linear optimization problem in
the form of a minimal linear state-space representation of the constraints and a quadratic
form of the utility expressed in terms of the states.
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